The Reactionary Turn of U.S. Conservatism and the Limits of Free Market Ideology

Since the late 1970s, a significant shift has occurred in the ideological configuration of the American Right. This transformation, I argue, is the result of a long-term project launched by New Right proponents, forming a coalition of conservative interest groups and political action committees. Funded by wealthy capitalists, these coalitions successfully pivoted the conservative appeal away from overt anti-communism, replacing it with emotionally charged issues centered on the erosion of traditional values. This shift allowed for a broader electoral appeal, especially among working-class voters disillusioned with economic decline and cultural upheaval.

The strategy was to create a reactionary politics capable of absorbing popular frustration without challenging the structure of capitalist accumulation. By focusing on symbolic issues—school prayer, abortion, immigration, and “family values”—this new Right secured support from religious fundamentalist groups and rural voters. Yet this populist front masked a deeper agenda: a counter-revolution against the gains of social justice movements and the regulatory state established during the New Deal and Great Society eras. The emotional radicalism was, in this view, a symptom of a more substantive rot: the inability of the economic system to meet human needs within its own logic of exploitation and profit.

This ideological transformation was consolidated under Ronald Reagan, whose presidency embodied a blend of libertarian rhetoric and authoritarian practice. While championing small government and free markets, Reagan’s administration escalated state violence, deregulated finance, and undermined labor. The contradiction between social conservatism and economic liberalism—core to U.S. right-wing thought—was reconfigured as a virtue rather than a paradox. The result is a movement that talks liberty while preparing for repression.

Recent developments, particularly proposals outlined in Project 2025, mark an intensification of this trajectory. Advocates of the “unitary executive theory” propose that the president exercise full control over the federal executive branch, including the power to reclassify tens of thousands of civil service roles as political appointments. This would dismantle the Pendleton Act of 1883, which enshrined merit-based hiring in the civil service to counteract political patronage. Should such a policy be implemented, it would face fierce legal challenges—yet Article II of the U.S. Constitution might be used to justify such executive overreach.

The logic of this reactionary movement is theological as much as political. As one critic notes, concepts like “wisdom,” “liberty,” and “love” are repurposed to justify obedience to leaders who claim divine sanction—figures like Trump become avatars of moral redemption rather than political actors. This distortion of values paves the way for authoritarianism cloaked in spiritual language. As social breakdown accelerates—via economic immiseration, cuts to public services, and institutional failure—the only remaining tool of governance will be state violence.

In economic terms, this shift is evidenced by the rejection of global free market orthodoxy. Trump's tariffs, hostility to multilateral trade, and suspicion of transnational institutions mark a break from the neoliberal consensus. Yet this is not a rupture with capitalism per se—it is capitalism in crisis, lashing out. Even the World Economic Forum’s promotion of “stakeholder capitalism” reflects an ideological scramble to save the system without reforming its exploitative core.

Historically, such periods of crisis have opened the door to fascism. The Nazis’ rise—from 2.6% in 1928 to 43.9% in 1933—was made possible by mass unemployment and the failure of the left to mount a united front. Trotsky foresaw this in 1931, warning that the Communist Party’s refusal to collaborate with the Social Democrats would cede power to the Nazis. The German bourgeoisie, gripped by fear, chose fascism over proletarian revolution.

This brings us to the strategic task of the present. We need a mass workers’ party, rooted in the trade unions, capable of raising transitional demands that expose the contradictions of capitalist society—demands for decent housing, real wage increases, secure employment. These cannot be met within the logic of a decaying system. Only the working class, organized and conscious, can lead the fight for a better world. The unions, once purged of their bureaucratic inertia, can serve as a force for relative autonomy from the parliamentary system, a system now visibly impotent in the face of capital’s crises.

The danger is clear. If we fail to provide a revolutionary alternative, the vacuum will be filled by reaction. Our response must be not only defensive but transformative.